The Park Place Economist
Volume 26

Issue 1

Article 13

2018

Analyzing the Mortgage Loan Value and Associated Risk for a
Commercial Bank
Brandon Fricke
Illinois Wesleyan University, bfricke@iwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace

Recommended Citation
Fricke, Brandon (2018) "Analyzing the Mortgage Loan Value and Associated Risk
for a Commercial Bank," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 26
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol26/iss1/13
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by editorial board of the Park Place Economist at Illinois Wesleyan
University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

Analyzing the Mortgage Loan Value and Associated Risk for a Commercial Bank
Abstract
In this paper I will analyze the loan amount to income level of individuals applying for mortgage loans in
the years following the financial recession. Additionally I will examine the impact that each independent
variable has on the overall loan amount. Underwriting looks at many of these variables when analyzing a
loan to determine a borrowers credit history. Here I will attempt to quantify the impact of some of these
variables. I will use time series analysis techniques to examine any trends and patterns within the ratio. It
is hypothesized that as applicant income increases, the loan amount applied for will increase at an even
larger percentage, as applicants now have more peace of mind and financial security.
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Analyzing the Mortgage Loan Value and Associated
Risk for a Commercial Bank
Brandon Fricke
I.

Introduction

Statistics and CoreLogic indicated that debt to income

It may seem hard to believe, but the modern

ratios were increasing in the years leading up to the

mortgage as we know it today has only been around

housing market collapse of 2007. Banks and lenders

since 1934. Under the new Federal Housing Admin-

alike were attempting to qualify more Americans for

istration (FHA) guidelines, they set up programs to

home loans that they could not afford all in an effort

offer individuals loans for 80 % loan-to-value and

to boost their bottom line. Mortgage debt figures

higher (How Mortgages Work 2002). Loan-to-value,

obtained from the Federal Reserve board of St. Louis

as defined by Investopedia(2017), is the amount of the

showed that mortgage debt was rapidly rising in the

mortgage lien divided by the appraised value of the

years leading up to the housing bubble burst. With

property. This created more opportunities for the aver-

an increase in debt, and thus increased levels of risk,

age American to own a home, and forced commercial

defaults and foreclosures could prove catastrophic to

banks to adopt similar lending policies. Initially this

the housing market, which is exactly what happened.

allowed the typical American, who couldn’t afford to

Homeowners with mortgage loans that they could not

make a down payment of 70 to 80 % under the old

afford because they took on too much risk began to

banking guidelines, to now qualify for a mortgage

default and banks began to repossess their houses. The

loan. However this new practice made mortgage lend-

bubble burst and the housing market began to bottom

ing far more risky; homeowners had far less invested

out with the number of individual defaults in the mil-

into their homes, and were taking out increasingly

lions per year (Equifax, 2017).Tighter regulations on

larger loans that many could not afford. Financial in-

mortgage loan qualifications were subsequently put in

stitutions were searching for another measure to iden-

place, including stricter regulations on debt to income

tify credit worthy customers and their ability to repay

levels of individuals looking for a mortgage loan. A

the mortgage loan. The debt-to-income ratio, or more

number of factors, including shock from the recent

simply the debt ratio, became a popular way to quanti-

collapse and strict regulations set out by the United

fy risk, and measures an individual’s debt payment to

States government and other Government-Sponsored

overall income.

Enterprises forced debt to income ratios of individuals

Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor

to decrease in the following years. Mortgage lenders
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seemingly began to issue loans only to those individu-

increases, the loan amount applied for will increase

als deemed credit worthy and demonstrated the ability

at an even larger percentage, as applicants now have

to repay their home loan.

more peace of mind and financial security.

Along with credit score, the debt ratio is one
of the primary factors in deciding if an individual will

Data and Methods

In order to test my hypothesis relating appli-

qualify for a loan. It is a crucial measure of overall

cant income to loan amount, data was obtained from a

loan risk that financial institutions look for (CFPB

commercial bank in Topeka, Kansas. This unique time

2017). If the average loan value to income level is

series analysis study will focus on the bank’s mortgage

increasing it could signal individuals and financial

lending practices from 2010 until 2017. Data on appli-

institutions taking on more risk in financing mortgag-

cant’s income and the corresponding loan amount will

es. Evidence from the Consumer Finance Protection

encompass the greater Topeka, Kansas geographical

Bureau suggests that borrowers with a higher debt to

area. The loan amount and applicant income figures I

income ratio are more likely to run into trouble mak-

will analyze have no specific frequency as loan vol-

ing monthly mortgage payments. As recent history has

umes have fluctuated throughout the past seven years.

shown us, high risk loans in the housing market can

From January of 2010 to September of 2017, the range

prove disastrous to the worldwide economy. As stat-

of data I will be analyzing, the volume of loans per

ed above, it is known that the loan amount to income

month and even per day fluctuated due to numerous

ratio was increasing nationwide up until 2007 when

factors. With a total of approximately 3000 loans to

it began to decline. In this paper I will analyze the

analyze over the past seven years we have an average

loan amount to income level of individuals applying

of 400 loans each year. Additionally loan amount and

for mortgage loans in the years following the finan-

applicants income are recorded in thousands of dol-

cial recession. Additionally I will examine the impact

lars, thus making it simpler to examine.

that each independent variable has on the overall loan
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II.

As previously stated, there is no specific fre-

amount. Underwriting looks at many of these variables

quency to the data analyzed as each day and month

when analyzing a loan to determine a borrowers credit

have different loan volumes. Mortgage lending is a

history. Here I will attempt to quantify the impact of

heavily seasonal industry according to the National

some of these variables. I will use time series analysis

Association of Realtors, and this trend is displayed in

techniques to examine any trends and patterns within

my data as well. During the winter months, typically

the ratio. It is hypothesized that as applicant income

November to January, loan volume is considerably
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lower than during the late spring and summer months.

amounts above 1000, or $1,000,000 since I am view-

Because of this discrepancy it will be important to test

ing the variables in thousands of dollars. By removing

for seasonality to statistically confirm our assumptions

these outliers I can better analyze the data and view

as well as seasonally adjust the series so we can ac-

any patterns present, excluding the statistical anoma-

curately analyze trends and patterns. Graph One takes

lies. Graph Two shows a scatter plot of loan amount to

all 3000 data points and averages each month’s loan

total income with a logarithmic regression line fitted

amounts and corresponding income values resulting in

to the series. A large majority of the data points are

a total of 93 months to evaluate. When looking at the

loan amounts below 500 and stated incomes below

graph there is a small but noticeable upward trend in

500. Graph Three now shows a scatter plot of the data

both variables values over the past seven years. This

points with the loan amounts and stated income levels

could be due to a number of factors including easing

above 500 excluded. As one can see, the fitted loga-

of credit requirements and economic recovery as I

rithmic regression line shows a similar trend to that

move farther and farther away from the financial crisis

of diminishing marginal returns. As income increases

and housing meltdown of 2007-2008. Another point

loan amount increases as well, but only to a certain

to note is that as the applicants stated income fluctu-

extent as shown by the regression line flattening out.

ates, the loan amount applied for closely resembles

This is in contradiction to my previous hypothesis, that

a similar pattern with a slight lag associated with it.

loan amount would increases exponentially relative to

However, both series show a considerable amount of

increased income.

volatility in them, making it difficult to predict future
values.

For this study I will be using the following estimation equation to analyze any correlation between

Because of the volatility and seasonality

loan amount and income level:

associated with my data I experience a wide range of

Δ Loan Amount = α + βΔ Income + βΔ Time

maximum and minimum values. Average loan amount,

The change in loan amount is dependent upon

excluding loan and income figures above 500, fluctu-

a constant factor plus the change in the independent

ates from 38 to 238 with applicant’s income showing

variables applicant income and time. With an improv-

similar fluctuations. One possible explanation to this

ing economy and a recovering housing market income

is a few data outliers that are present in our two se-

as well as loan amount would be expected to rise.

ries, which distorts the mean for those months. When

Additionally, as income increases consumers will have

looking at the raw unadjusted data there are four loan

greater purchasing power and the increased ability
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to take a larger mortgage loan. Because the economy

& Keeley 1989). They found that as capital increased,

continues to improve, the housing market has been re-

and thus the leverage ratio also increased, banks began

covering and annual inflation has been increasing. The

to invest in more prudent assets which reduced overall

variable time is expected to have a positive correlation

default risk. A higher leverage ratio is thus considered

with loan amount. Thus the dependent variable and

safer for banks as they must use more of their own

both independent variables are expected to take pos-

capital to finance loans or sell off the most risky assets

itive values. Limitations for this analysis come from

and investments.

the volatility of the series as well as the seasonality
component which will be corrected when I adjust the

dence supporting Furlong and Keeley’s original hy-

variables for seasonality.

pothesis. Their study furthered the original work and

In this study I will use EViews software to

found evidence of pro-cyclical patterns in the capital

analyze the data and use ordinary least squares to run a

to asset ratio. The pro cyclical nature of the leverage

regression. Additionally I will use the ADF and KPSS

ratio acts as an amplification mechanism to business

tests to check for unit roots and stationarity in the se-

cycles upturns and downturns (Adrian & Shin 2010).

ries. Testing for unit roots and stationarity, a common

As asset values increase from an improving econo-

time series practice, will determine the order of inte-

my a bank’s leverage ratio falls and they will have a

gration of our series. Finally I will test the residuals to

surplus of capital. Banks will then purchase additional

ensure they behave normally and would not adversely

assets or securities to more than just restore the previ-

affect my regression results.

ous leverage ratio. An upward pressure on asset prices

III.

Literature Review and Theory

The correlation between loan amount and

58

A 2010 study by Adrian and Shin found evi-

follows and thus the upward spiral begins. Equally, a
negative shock to asset prices would trigger a down-

stated income values has been heavily analyzed since

ward spiral of leverage. Leading up to the 2008 finan-

the housing crisis of 2008 because it is a strong mea-

cial crisis asset prices and mortgage-backed securities

sure of risk associated with the mortgage loan. The

were rising rapidly, thus lowering banks’ leverage

risk from the bank’s perspective has been analyzed

ratios. Banks began to make riskier investments into

with the leverage ratio, or capital to assets that a bank

the sub-prime market granting credit to borrowers who

uses to fund a loan. Furlong and Keeley studied the

did not have the ability to repay. What followed was

relationship between bank’s leverage ratio and the risk

the subsequent financial crisis and downturn in the

associated with their portfolio investments (Furlong

business cycle.
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These findings are in contradiction to the

my study examines the risk associated with individual

results of previous studies from Koehn that found the

borrowers at the microeconomic level. Additionally I

opposite effect; an increase in the leverage ratio was

am also analyzing the loan to income ratio of individ-

associated with an increase in investment risk (Koehn,

uals to examine default risk, which has proven to be a

1979). His explanation was that as the capital-to-asset

good measure.

ratio rises, banks can afford to give out fewer loans as

Underwriting standards are the final measure

their capital is tied up elsewhere. Thus they would be

in approving or denying a loan. It will determine how

incentivized to invest in more risky assets to maintain

much debt can be issued, the terms of the loan, and an-

a profit level. More recent studies from Lee and Hsieh

alyzes the borrowing history of customers. Underwrit-

found similar results, and concluded that the parallel

ers must determine if a borrower can repay the loan,

relationship between capital and risk levels was due to

analyzing income, employment, and bank statements.

moral hazard and bank managers not doing enough to

Based on these factors as well as the credit history of

avoid unnecessary risk (Lee & Hsieh, 2013).

the borrower will determine if the loan amount applied

Furthermore, numerous studies have been con-

for will be approved. In 1996, Brent Ambrose devel-

ducted in determining if a loan will be approved and

oped a model of the market for commercial real estate

how much debt can be issued to a borrower. Loan to

loans based on these variables used in property deci-

value, according to Investopedia, is one of the primary

sion making (Ambrose 1996). Underwriting standards,

measures if a loan will be approved. In 1992 Vandell

according to Ambrose, determine the supply price of

used a bi-proportional hazard model to examine risk

mortgage loans. He also found that as lines of credit

associated with mortgage loans (Vandell, 1992). He

tighten, and thus underwriting standards tighten, the

found that at the individual borrower level, loan-to-

loan to value ratio is forced to decrease. With a larger

value was the primary determinant of mortgage de-

down payment by consumers banks can now finance

fault. Banks denying loans based on inadequate loan

the loan using less of their own capital and still main-

to value ratios are highly correlated with a reduction

tain adequate leverage ratios, thus ensuring they make

in mortgage defaults. In 1994 Abraham furthered the

prudent investments.

original findings and concluded that while loan-to-val-

Many of the above studies analyze macroeco-

ue is highly correlated with default rates, the debt-cov-

nomic data with a wide scope and scale. My study

erage ratio has greater explanatory power in deter-

is more focused to microeconomic data analyzing a

mining mortgage defaults. Similar to Vandell’s study,

single commercial bank. Similar to Ambrose’s 1996

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXVI

59

study, I am attempting to quantify how much these

spurious results. Table One shows the ADF and KPSS

variables that underwriting examines affect the over-

tests for the variable applicant income. I can, at the

all loan amount. Adding to the above theories I will

99% confidence level, reject the null hypothesis of the

analyze the risk associated with the banks mortgage

ADF test and assume that the series does not contain

lending strategies and attempt to calculate what vari-

a unit root in levels. Furthermore when examining the

ables impact the loan amount. I will determine if the

KPSS test I cannot confidently reject, and thus must

commercial bank analyzed is increasing their risk

accept, the null hypothesis that the series is stationary

levels by granting loans to less credit worthy borrow-

in levels. Table Two again runs the same ADF and

ers, indicated by an increasing spread in loan amount

KPSS tests now on the variable loan amount and finds

to applicant income.

similar results. I can again assume, with 99% confi-

IV.

Results

dence, that the series does not contain a unit root in

As shown in Graph One, loan amount and ap-

levels and that the series is stationary. Additionally,

plicant income have proven to be volatile series since

because I can confidently assume there is no unit root

2010. Some of this volatility could be due to the heavy

present and the series is stationary in levels I say my

seasonality component associated with mortgage lend-

series is integrated of order zero, I(0).

ing. As stated before, mortgage lending is a heavily

With all of the variables stationary and the pre-

seasonal industry according to the National Associa-

liminary transformations completed it is now possible

tion of Realtors. To compensate for this, I have sea-

to run a regression using ordinary least squares. The

sonally adjusted both the loan amount and applicant

basic regression equation generated is as follows:

income using the Census X12 method and the seasonal
means for both variables can be seen in Graph Four.

LOAN =24.566 + 1.058 INCOME + 0.2838 TIME +

The final regression equation will examine seasonally

112.6 DUMMY

adjusted variables.
Before running the OLS regression we must

60

Seasonally adjusted loan amount is the depen-

ensure that the series is stationary and does not contain

dent variable. It is a function of a constant plus appli-

a unit root. To do so I will run standard time series

cant’s income as well as time and a dummy variable.

tests, namely the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and

Again, the variables are in terms of thousands and the

Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) tests to

coefficients are thus reported accordingly. Addition-

ensure my series is stationary and would not produce

ally I have added a dummy variable to the regression

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXVI

equation for December of 2016. Graph Five shows the

used. For this regression the adjusted R-squared took a

residual diagnostics when no dummy variable was im-

value of 0.5266, meaning that 52.6% of the variability

plemented and it is clear that the residual for this time

in loan amount is explained by our independent vari-

period takes a value well outside the standard devia-

ables. The F-statistic, which assumes that all coeffi-

tion. Thus I have implemented a dummy variable for

cients actually have a value of zero, can be confidently

December of 2016 to remove the residual data outlier.

rejected and thus we can assume our variables have

Table Three outlines the regression results in
detail with the total observations, or months analyzed,

explanatory power.
We must also test the residuals of the regres-

being 93. The constant term of the equation indicates

sion to ensure they have a constant variance, show no

that when all other variables take a value of zero, the

signs of autocorrelation, and behave normally. When

loan amount will still be $24,566. Applicant’s income,

measuring for autocorrelation we use the Breusch

as expected, had the greatest impact on loan amount

Godfrey test which has a null hypothesis that the

out of all the variables analyzed. For every $1,000

residuals are not auto-correlated. Because the p-value

increase in applicant’s income, the loan amount would

falls outside our range of confidence we cannot reject

increase by $1,058. More simply, a $1.00 increase in

the null hypothesis, and thus must assume that the

income results in a $1.06 increase in loan amount. Fur-

residuals do not show signs of autocorrelation. Addi-

thermore, the income variable is significant at the 99%

tionally we must use the Jarque Berra test to examine

confidence level. Additionally I have added a variable

the normality of the residuals. The null hypothesis for

to capture how the loan amount will change over time.

this test is that the residuals are normally distributed.

Time, measured in months, is statistically significant

Because the P-value falls well outside our range of

at the 99% confidence level. As each month passes

confidence we cannot reject the null hypothesis and

the loan amount will increase by $284. This could be

thus must assume that the residuals behave normally.

due to a number of factors including an improving

Finally we must test for heteroscedasticity, or that the

economy and inflation increasing. Time, while not as

residuals have a constant variance, using White’s test.

impactful as income, still has a significant influence on

Because our p-value is above 0.05 we can assume that

the loan amount. The adjusted R-squared measures the

our residuals are homoscedastic. Overall our residuals

variability in the dependent variable as explained by

show no signs of autocorrelation, are normally distrib-

the independent variables in the model, but adjusts the

uted, and have constant variance. Thus our residuals

statistic based on the number of independent variables

should not adversely affect our regression results.

The Park Place Economist, Volume XXVI

61

V.

Conclusions

plicant income, showed no unit root and were station-

As one can see from Graph One, applicants
income closely follows the pattern and trend of loan
amount. This broadly indicates that the bank is not

of order zero, I(0).
As anticipated, the variable of applicant in-

resorting to risky mortgage lending practices, as the

come had the largest effect on overall loan amount and

ratio of applicant’s income to loan amount is relatively

was statistically significant. For every $1,000 increase

stable. If the spread between loan amount and appli-

in income the loan amount will rise by $1058. Loan

cant income was increasing it would have signified

amount is also a factor of time, measured in months,

borrowers taking on more debt and increasing risk

and was statistically significant. As each month pass-

to both parties. Additionally loan amount does not

es the loan amount will increase by $284 holding all

increase exponentially as income increases. In fact this

other variables constant. This could be due to infla-

study shows that as income is increasing loan amount

tion, the improving economy, a rising local housing

also increases, but only to a certain extent. These

market or a combination of the three. Additionally the

findings could be due in part by bank size and lending

constant term indicated that when all other variables

limits.

took a value of zero the loan amount would still be
As stated before, the data collected for this

$24,566. The dummy variable implemented was again

study was obtained from a commercial bank in To-

used to remove the residual outlier from December

peka, Kansas. Because there were varying amounts

2016. I can confidently reject the F-statistic as well,

of loans issued each month no two months were the

and assume that the coefficients take a value other

same. For simplicity I averaged each month’s loan

than zero. Finally, the adjusted R-square took a value

amount and income to have a total of 93 data points

of 0.5266 indicating that the independent variables

from January 2010 to September of 2017. Due to the

explain 52.6% of the variance in the loan amount. The

seasonality and low volume of loans in the winter

residual diagnostics showed positive results, indicating

months I removed all seasonal components of the data

no autocorrelation and normally distributed residuals

using the Census X12 method. Thus the regression

with a constant variance.

equation used included the seasonally adjusted vari-

62

ary in levels. As such the series is said to be integrated

In 1992 Vandall studied the relationship be-

ables. Before running a regression I tested the data for

tween the loan-to-value and default risk in mortgage

unit roots and stationarity using the ADF and KPSS

lending. He found that an increase in the ratio was

tests respectively. Both variables, loan amount and ap-

strongly correlated with mortgage default. Addition-
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ally, Ambrose found that underwriting standards will
help determine the amount of debt issued. Here I am
examining risk associated with mortgage lending, both
to the bank and the consumer. While underwriting
standards are unique to each lender and personalized
to each borrower, I am attempting to quantify the loan
amount using two independent variables. The findings
could be useful in numerous ways. Bank and lending
underwriters could use this to see how much of an im-
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